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Abstract - The research described in this paper deals with the effects of faults on
complex physical systems, with particular emphasis on aircraft and spacecraft
systems. Given that a malfunction has occurred and been diagnosed, the goal is to
determine how that fault will propagate to other subsystems, and what the effects will
be on vehicle functionality. In particular, we describe the use of qualitative spatial
simulation to determine the physical propagation of fault effects in three-dimensional
space.
INTRODUCTION
The work described in this paper was performed in conjunction with
the fault management research under way at the Vehicle Operations
Research Branch of NASA/Langley Research Center. The goal of this
research is to produce software that can serve as an in-flight pilot's
aid to assist the flight crew when feasible. In particular, artificial
intelligence (AI) techniques are being used to construct systems that
will assist flight crews in dealing with in-flight malfunctions.
Any system malfunction raises three categories of questions: what has
gone wrong (diagnosis), how will the system be affected (prognosis),
and what should be done about it (recovery planning). Fault diagnosis is
handled by an array of techniques including traditional rule-based
systems, model-based monitoring (MONITAUR [Schutte]), and
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model-based reasoning from first principles (DRAPHYS [Abbott]). The
research described in this paper is concerned chiefly with the
prognosis of fault propagation, and takes as input the diagnoses
produced by the DRAPHYS system. The physical propagation of fault
effects is then simulated to determine possible effects on the
air/spacecraft. It is also the case, however, that similar techniques
can be run off-line to help construct the physical dependency net used
by DRAPHYS. Since DRAPHYS plays a major role in this research, we
begin by giving a brief description of this system.
THE DRAPHYS FAULT DIAGNOSIS SYSTEM
DRAPHYS reads in a database describing a set of components,
predicates indicating which components are sensors and with which
non-sensor components the sensors are associated, and predicates
describing functional and physical dependencies among components.
For example, the predicate Sensor(N2B(CompressorB)) indicates that
N2B is a sensor associated with jet turbine component CompressorB.
A component Y is deemed to be functionally dependent on another
component X if a malfunction in X can affect the functioning of Y. A
malfunction in CompressorB, for example, will affect the operation of
CombustorB. Clearly any sensor associated with component X is
functionally dependent on X. DRAPHYS uses such functional dependency
information in its model of the physical system.
The other kind of dependency information utilized by DRAPHYS is
physical dependency relationships. Component Y is deemed to be
physically dependent on component X if a malfunction in X can
physically damage Y. For example, examination of aircraft accident
reports reveals that a disproportionate number of mishaps caused by
physical component malfunction involves events such as turbine blades
breaking loose and damaging nearby (and sometimes distant)
components.
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DRAPHYS makes its diagnosis by initially suspecting all components
that could conceivably be implicated in the malfunction. Each of these
fault hypotheses is then tested by determining whether, for every
symptomatic sensor, there is a symptomatic path in the functional or
physical dependency nets from the suspect component to the sensor. A
symptomatic path is one that passes only through components that are
either uninstrumented or have symptomatic sensors. DRAPHYS returns
as output the set of suspect components that pass this test; the
hoped-for result is that this set will be a singleton. It is worth noting
that the set of suspects can be pruned dynamically as new symptoms
arrive.
Since the functioning of aircraft and spacecraft systems is
well-understood, it is generally straightforward (though tedious) to
develop the database describing the functional dependency relations.
Physical dependencies, however, are a different matter: the possible
interactions among components are numerous and unpredictable. The
expedient used in DRAPHYS has been to include the most obvious
interactions (typically from the turbines and similar energy-bearing
components to nearby components) and hope for the best. This approach
is adequate for simple models, but becomes intractable for realistic
cases. A more systematic approach was required.
Since we are operating on the assumption that the failed component has
been diagnosed by DRAPHYS, we can use this information as starting
point for the reasoning process. Beginning at the failed component,
subsequent events are generated by means of a qualitative spatial
simulation, in order to determine possible physical propagation paths.
In the next section we describe the nature of this simulation process.
QUALITATIVE SIMULATION OF PHYSICAL FAULT PROPAGATION
We have found that a wide variety of malfunctions of physical systems
can be characterized as leaks, i.e. the uncontrolled escape of a
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substance into the environment. Malfunctions such as burst hydraulic
or gas lines are, of course, literally leaks. It has also proved useful,
however, to treat short circuits as electrical leaks, fires as gas and
thermal leaks, and mechanical malfunctions such as explosive
decomposition or breakage as leaks of kinetic or potential energy. Our
approach, then, is to use knowledge of the malfunction site and its
nature, together with a database describing the 3-dimensional extent
and composition of physical structures, to simulate the consequences
of the leak in question.
At the present stage of research we have implemented the capability to
simulate fluid leaks, and have a partial implementation of kinetic
energy leaks. (An example of such an energy leak is provided by the
turbine disintegration that caused the recent crash of United 231 by
propagating to the hydraulic control lines.) We have found that a
limited set of principles and constructs has emerged that has allowed
the systematic and expeditious creation of qualitative spatial
simulations, as well as their extension to new malfunction
categories. These constructs are described in the next section.
The Simulation
The qualitative simulation of fault propagation in 3-space (and time)
requires the spatial representation of physical structures. This
requirement raises problems that are more typical of graphics
applications than classical simulation programs. In particular, two
broad categories of spatial representation exist: volumetric and
boundary representations [Requicha]. Volumetric representations
describe an object by systematically subdividing space and describing
the content of each subdivision. Boundary representation techniques
describe solids in terms of their enclosing surfaces.
The best-known volumetric representation technique is probably
oct-trees [Jackins]; boundary representations are more commonly found
in applications such as CAD/CAM systems. The current implementation
184
c-3
uses a boundary representation technique, since the computations
required to perform the simulation are more efficient in this
representation. Alternate representations are, however, still under
active consideration.
To describe a physical object such as an aircraft or spacecraft, the
user enters sets of (coplanar) points in 3-space into the database;
each such point determines the vertex of a planar plate. The present
system constrains the point sets to be convex polyhedra; the planes
defined by such point sets are thus more accurately described as
convex polyhedral plates in 3-space. These plates form the surfaces of
the volumes to be represented. Furthermore, the user may specify
points and volumes that represent components, i.e. entities and
subsystems that can fail. Malfunctions occur at/in components, and
propagate from component to component, either physically or
functionally.
Our simulation system is based on a package of procedures for
performing a basic set of geometric computations on the
representation of 3-dimensional objects described above. These
procedures include algorithms to compute the intersection of two or
more planes, the intersection of lines and planes, the gradient
(downward direction) at a point in the plane, and similar computations.
These procedures, in turn, are based on more fundamental routines that
find the equation of a plane, given the defining vertices, that
determine whether a point is in a plane (i.e. within the polygon
defining the planar plate), and similar auxiliary functions. As indicated
above, the function library we have developed, while of moderate size,
appears to be powerful enough to support an extensive variety of
3-space simulations. We will describe the simulation of the
propagation of faults resulting from fluid leaks in some detail, and end
by indicating how additional categories of leaks can be represented.
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Simulation of Fluid Leaks
As stated previously, a wide variety of malfunctions can be
conceptualized as leaks of some type of substance or entity. It was
deemed reasonable to begin our investigation by attempting a
qualitative simulation of fluid leaks. While such malfunctions are more
likely to cause problems via functional rather than physical
propagation, fluid leaks can propagate physically by shorting out
accessible electrical components, corrosion, and a wide variety of
other types of spoilage. A more important consideration, however, was
the expectation (justified, as it happens) that the algorithms
developed in the process of implementing a qualitative simulation of
fluid leakage would form a basis for simulating other kinds of faults
as well. By way of example, propagation from gas leaks can be
simulated by running the fluid leak simulation twice, the second time
with the direction of gravity reversed.
Recall that DRAPHYS produces as output the identity of the initial
failed component. Since malfunctions can occur only in components,
and since the physical location and extent of each component is stored
in the database, we will assume that the exact location of the leak is
known. This is in fact a simplifying assumption for the purposes of this
discussion, since in most cases the sort of components that can leak
fluid will be pipes, which typically extend for considerable distances.
A description of each component can be stored in the database, so that
the nature of the leak (fluid type, pressure) can be retrieved. For
aircraft the leaking fluid will usually be hydraulic fluid or fuel. We
make the additional simplifying assumption that the fluid is not under
high pressure (else techniques more appropriate to energy leaks
become appropriate), that there are no complications such as phase
changes or leakage into slipstreams, and that the leaking fluid remains
inside the air/spacecraft (we cannot simulate "blue ice" at this stage
of the game).
We thus have a fluid leaking into the vehicle interior from a known
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Simulation-based reasoning of the sort described in the present paper,
as well as the work of [Taylor] and [Gardin], represent explorations in
reasoning techniques based on analogical representations.
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The power system is treated as a
multi-level and hierarchical diagnosed
system,
The diagnosed system is divided into
separated subsystems at each
hierarchical level,
A subsystem consists of one or several
diagnosed components which have some
kinds of characteristic relations,
An abnormal or faulted component to be
diagnosed is a subsystem at the lowest
level.
For example, assuming that the part
enclosed with a dotted line in Fig. 2 is live, a
description of the HSM is as shown in Figure 3.
III. CAUSE EFFECT RELATION (CERM).
In order to efficiently perform
diagnostic reasoning, some experimental and
heuristic diagnosis knowledge is integrated into
the KB to speed up the failure search. The
CERM employs a semantic network approach
(Toransso, et a1..1987) coupled with the search
for failure by using indirect relationships
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between failure and symptoms. In addition,
CERM bridges the gap between electric
symptoms and failures in non- electric parts.
COMBINATORY DIAGNOSIS PRINCIPLES IN
KBIMD.
To achieve a speedy and accurate
implementation of diagnostic reasoning in the ES
suggested for KBIMD, a combinatory diagnosis
KB scheme is developed. The functions are
discussed in four different subsystems below.
1 . DIAGNOSIS BASED ON FIRST
PRINCIPLES (DBFP).
The DBFP subsystem obtains
information from structural description of
diagnosed objects quantities and behaviors.
This subsystem employs a validation check on
physical laws to pinpoint the existence of
failures.
For example, in Figure 2, the sum of
primary currents at CT1 or CT2, CT21 or
CT22, CT14 or CT13, CT24 or CT23 are
checked on the same phase conductors and
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checked for zero measurements at normal
conditions. If non-zero values are obtained, a
failure signal is flagged.
, DIAGNOSIS BASED ON STRUCTURE
(DBSK)
The diagnosis is based on the multilevel
and hierarchical structure (HSM) of the electric
power subsystem. It begins with the highest
level of the HSM and moves to the lower level
in the model. As in previous levels, it employs
first principle and experimental knowledge as
tools for its diagnostic reasoning. This (DBSK)
is capable of narrowing down possible failure to
a low level within a small region. The
application of this structure-based diagnosis
scheme is demonstrated for failure of CT13 in
Figure 2.
The sequence of diagnostic reasoning in
a multilevel sequence is shown in Fig 3. It
illustrates the failure search pattern from level
I to level V.
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Ill. DIAGNOSIS BASED ON FUNCTION
KNOWLEDGE (DBFK).
The function-based diagnosis is
employed only when failure search has been
narrowed to a suspected component, it is the
functional relation and model of diagnosed
component. The DBFK identifies suspected
failures or eliminates a suspicion. In the latter,
this suspicion is recorded as a failure
disturbance. The recorded components are
available for subsequent diagnosis.
IV. DIAGNOSIS BASED ON EXPERIENTIAL
KNOWLEDGE (DBEK).
Experiential knowledge of human
experts is based on their diagnostic practice
over a lengthen period of time. This allows
them to diagnose failure faster, accurately and
efficiently. The DBEK employs the following
different strategies to construct the knowledge
bases.
(a). Identification Based on Comparison.
This involves cross comparison
between a given component of the same type
with same input. If one of them is faulty, the
observation will yield different results, The
second is the self-comparison approval which
compares the components with current
observation on a component with its historical
record. The difference is used to verify the
possibility of a fault. The third approach
removes a component part of the HSM system
and checks if it leads to a failure-free system,
and then recommendation of the fault situation
is suggested.
(b). Determination of Diagnostic Ordering.
When diagnostic reasoning is exhausted,
further diagnostic reasoning is needed to
execute the experience of failure probability.
The diagnostic ordering scheme identifies
components guaranteed to fail.
(c). Discrimination Based on Historical
Record.
When recent historical records on
components manifest repeated "failure
disturbance." It is certain that a fault exist in
the component.
(d). Discrimination Based on the CERM.
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